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10.1 Roughly Coincident Indicators and the Dating of Business Cycles
Economic indicators, as a general category, are descriptive and anticipatory
data used as tools for business conditions analysis and forecasting. 1 There are
potentially as many subsets of indicators in this sense as there are different
targets at which they can be directed. For example, some indicators may relate
to employment; others to inflation.
This brings to mind the uses ofsuch time series as lagged explanatory var-
iables in econometric models and regression equations. But there is a differ-
ent, established meaning to what is often called the "indicatorapproach." This
is a system of data and procedures designed to monitor, signal, and confirm
cyclical changes, especially turning points, in the economy at large. The se-
ries that serve this purpose are selected for being comprehensive and system-
atically related to business cycles and are known as cyclical indicators.
Business cycles are recurrent sequences ofalternating phases ofexpansion
and contraction that involve a great number of diverse economic processes
and show up as distinct fluctuations in comprehensive series on production,
employment, income, and trade-aspects ofaggregate economic activity. The
end ofeach expansion is marked by a cluster ofpeaks in such series; the end
ofeach contraction, by a cluster of troughs. Analysts at the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) base the dating of business cycle peaks and
troughs on the identification and analysis ofsuch clusters, that is, the consen-
sus ofthe corresponding turning points in the principal coincident indicators. I
This is done because (1) the comovement ofthe indicators is itselfan essential
characteristic of the business cycle; (2) no single adequate measure ofaggre-
gate economic activity is available in a consistent form for a long historical
1. This section draws in parton Zamowitz and Moore 1977, p. 476-507. It is also based in part
on Zamowitz 1987, as are some other sections ofthis chapter.
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period; and (3) economic statistics generally are subject to error, so that the
evidence from a number of independently compiled indicators tends to be
more reliable than the evidence from any individual series. The NBER refer-
ence chronologies of business cycle peaks and troughs (Bums and Mitchell
1946, ch. 4; Moore 1961, chs. 5 and 6; Zarnowitz and Moore 1977, 1981;
Moore and Zarnowitz 1986) are widely used in academic as well as current
business research.
Figure 10. 1 illustrates the process ofdating business cycles with the aid of
12 indicators in real terms for 1972-76. This period was one of a slowing
expansion, a mild downturn followed by an accelerating contraction, an
abrupt upturn, and more gradual recovery. It was complicated by an unantici-
pated rise in inflation following highly stimulative monetary and fiscal poli-
cies of 1971-72; exogenous increases in prices of raw materials and agricul-
tural products during 1973; and the oil embargo and huge hikes in energy
costs in 1973:4 and 1974:1. Real retail sales peaked as early as March 1973,
industrial production in June 1974, employee-hours in nonagricultural estab-
lishments as late as October 1974. Despite this considerable scatter ofdates,
there was a definite concentration ofpeaks in the series on output, real income
and sales, and inverted unemployment around November 1973 and 1973:4
(the x's denote the specific-cycle turns on the chart).
The troughs in the specific cycles for the twelve series show less ofa scatter,
but here too retail sales in constant dollars turned up early (November 1974)
and employment late (June 1975). The other ten series all reached their local
minima in March 1975 or 1975:1.
Aspects ofgeneral economic activity admit ofdifferent measurements, and
their alternative statistical representations contain largely unknown data er-
rors. For these reasons, evidence from two or more closely related or partly
overlapping series is considered in deciding on when recessions began and
ended.
No aggregates in current dollars are shown in the figures presented here but
the original work on dating the contraction of 1973-75 included an examina-
tion of seven such series (GNP, final sales, value of goods output, personal
income, retail sales, manufacturing and trade sales, and wages and salaries.in
manufacturing, mining, and construction; see Zarnowitz and Moore 1977).
The nominal totals represent the original form in which many economic trans-
actions take place and are motivated and recorded. In times ofstable prices or
cyclical alternation ofinflation and deflation, such series would show distinct
rises and declines in levels and be given much weight in the process ofdating
business cycles. However, in times ofcontinuing strong inflation the current-
dollar aggregates often do not decline at all in recessions. 2 The deflated series
2. For example, of the seven series listed at the beginning of this paragraph, only the last two
had SPecific-cycle contractions at any time in the Period covered (and brief and shallow at that,
corresponding to the last and worst part of the contraction in late 1974 and early 1975). See
Zamowitz and Moore 1977, p. 479 and 482 for charts ofthe levels and deviations from trend for
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and indexes ofphysical volume are then given decisive weight as representing
more closely what is commonly understood by "recession" and "recovery."
When trend adjusted, however, the nominal indicators commonly show signif-
icant declines that indicate their participation in growth cycles.
The choice ofNovember 1973 for the business cycle peak and March 1975
for the business cycle trough was ultimately based on judgmentally weighted
evidence from the series displayed in figure 10.1. It is confirmed by the com-
posite index shown on figure 10.2, which covers eleven real indicators. 3
A diffusion index based on the same series shows in cumulated form the
excess ofthe percentage ofindicators expanding over the percentage contract-
ing, using cyclical peaks and troughs to define these phases. As plotted on
figure 10.2, this index reached a high plateau in November 1973 and drifted
neither upward nor downward for about a year thereafter (meaning that about
half of its components were expanding and half contracting). This series,
which summarizes the underlying data in a complementary but less informa-
tive way, is only in a very broad sense consistent with the choice of the No-
vember 1973 peak but supports strongly the March 1975 trough date.
How prompt and confident the determination of a business cycle peak or
trough can be depends on how close the consensus of the corresponding
specific-cycle tum is. When the latter are widely dispersed, as in the case of
the 1973-74 peaks, the dating is difficult and must not be rushed; when they
are not, as in the case ofthe 1975 troughs, the recognition that a new phase of
the cycle has begun is relatively easy and quick. Gradual downturns and sharp
upturns characterized several postwar business cycles, whereas the opposite
was true ofthe major interwar cycle, where the declines took much less time
to start than to end.
In sum, this example demonstrates one important use of the cyclical indi-
cators, namely, the identification and dating of business contractions and
slowdowns. The construction ofthe historical reference cycle chronologies at
NBER was always based on a similar detailed inspection ofthe available data,
mainly for those indicators considered to have "roughly coincident" timing.
(Ofcourse, the statistical information for the more distant past has been much
more limited.) The January 1980 business cycle peak was the first determined
by a formally constituted NBER Committee on Business Cycle Dating con-
vened on June 3, 1980 (for a report, see Zamowitz and Moore 1981).
10.2 Growth Cycles and Business Cycles
Figure 10.3 presents the turning points in the corresponding trend-adjusted
series used to date growth cycles. The specific-cycle peaks in these data fall
3. These are the· same series as in figure 10. 1, except that the rate ofunemployment is omitted
(the number of unemployed is retained). Composite indexes are computed by standardizing the
monthly percentage changes in the component series so as to prevent the more volatile series from
dominating the index; averaging the standardized changes for each successive month; and cumu-
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Fig. 10.1 Selected measures ofaggregate economic activity, levels, 1972-76
























Fig. 10.2 Composite index and cumulative diffusion index oforiginal data, 11
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into two groups: 1973:1 or March for GNP, sales, and personal income in
constant dollars; and September-November 1973 for industrial production
and the employment and unemployment series. As the slowdown preceded
the recession, most of the peaks in the detrended indicators occurred earlier
than their counterparts in the original series. In contrast, the trough dates were
generally unaffected by the trend adjustments, which is typically the case
when the upturn is well articulated. When the recovery starts slowly, the
troughs in the detrended series tend to lag behind the corresponding troughs
in the unadjusted series.
Figure 10.4 shows that the composite index based on the deviations from
trend of the eleven real indicators reached a peak in March 1973 and varied
only a little during the next nine months. This marks the peak of the growth
cycle, that is, the beginning ofthe 1973 slowdown that turned into a recession
near the end ofthe year. The index clearly stopped falling and started rising in
March 1975, the date ofthe trough in both the business cycle and the growth
cycle. The corresponding cumulative diffusion index in the lower part of fig-
ure 10.4 provides roughly consistent evidence.
Each ofthe seven recessions of 1948-80 was preceded by a phase ofposi-
tive but below-average growth, but these slowdowns lengthened from 2-6
months for the first four of the peaks to 8-13 months for the last three. The
long slowdowns marked the ends of the expansions of 1961-69, 1970-73,
and 1975-80, and were related to intensified inflation and price shocks, gov-
ernment interventions, reduced rates of private investment and productivity,
and the increasing role of service employment. Only the short and weak ex-
pansion of 1980-81 ended without any significant slowdown.
If long slowdowns always ended in recessions, they would be very helpful
to those engaged in predicting (as distinct from dating) business cycle peaks.
But some growth cycle declines interrupt rather than disrupt business cycle
expansion (as discussed in chapters 6 and 7). It turns out to be particularly
hard to distinguish between these two types of slowdown on a current or
timely basis.
10.3 Timing ofSpecific Cycles: Leading and Lagging Indicators
Differences among business cycles are naturally reflected in the behavior of
cyclical indicators. In a growing economy expansions must be on average
larger than contractions in terms of output, employment, etc., and they are
also likely to be longer. The individual cycles and their phases, however, vary
greatly in duration and amplitude. These differences are systematically related
to the scope or diffusion of cyclical movements among different units of ob-
servation (e.g., activities, regions, industries). Vigorous expansions are gen-
erally more widespread than weak expansions; severe contractions are more
widespread than mild contractions. Consider diffusion indexes, that is, time
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Fig. 10.3 Selected measures ofaggregate economic activity, deviations from
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Fig. 10.4 Composite index and cumulative diffusion index ofdeviations from
trend, 11 real series, 1972-76293 Cyclical Indicators
rising in each successive unit period. Such indexes are correlated with the
rates of change in, and tend to lead the levels of, the corresponding aggre-
gates. Information about the direction of the change, hence surveys designed
to produce timely diffusion measures on actual or expected sales, prices, prof-
its, etc., are popular in many countries.
As observed across a wide spectrum of variables, the specific cycles differ
greatly and in part systematically. What matters particularly in the present
context is the characteristic variation of cyclical indicators with respect to
their relative timing. Thus many economic time series, called leading indica-
tors, tend to reach their turning points before the corresponding business cycle
turns. There are also many series that tend to reach their turning points after
the peaks and troughs in the business cycle, and they are the lagging indica-
tors.
The leading series represent largely flow and price variables that are highly
sensitive to the overall cyclical influences but also to shorter random distur-
bances; hence they show large cyclical rises and declines but also high volatil-
ity. Coincident series such as those shown in figure 10.1 have cyclical move-
ments that generally come closer to one-to-one correspondence with business
expansions and contractions, and are much smoother. At the same time, the
fluctuations in the approximately coincident indicators tend to be smaller than
those in the more responsive leaders. Lagging indicators include some mas-
sive stock variables which move cyclically much less yet and are extremely
smooth.
The tripartition according to timing is not exhaustive and not always so
simple. Apart from series that do not conform to business cycles at all or have
irregular timing, there are some that have mixed timing (e.g., lead at peaks
and lag at troughs, or vice versa).
Gradual changes in timing also appear in some variables, reflecting the ef-
fects of structural or institutional changes. For example, the index of indus-
trial production lagged at most ofthe business cycle peaks in 1920-37 but led
at most of the peaks in 1948-81. Although short intervals prevailed among
these observations in both periods, the timing ofproduction was more nearly
coincident in the interwar than in the postwar cycles. This may be due to the
decline ofthe share in employment ofthe sectors covered by this index (man-
ufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities). Against the backdrop ofthe
rising size and weight of broadly defined services, it is now possible for
the index ofindustrial production to tum down without pulling the rest ofthe
economy promptly into a recession. Employment in goods-producing indus-
tries actually declined in 1967 and 1985-86, years of continued expansion.
Total nonfarm employment now tends to have more short lags and fewer short
leads and coincidences compared with its historical timing at business cycle
turns. This is likely to be attributable to the rising trend and weight of over-
head labor and service jobs.294 Chapter Ten
10.4 Alternative Interpretations and Uses ofLagging Indicators
A large majority ofindicators show positive conformity to business cycles,
that is, they tend to increase in expansions and decrease in contractions sub-
ject to leads or lags that are small in comparison to the durations of their
cyclical movements. Some indicators, such as the rates of unemployment,
delinquent loans, and business failures, show inverse conformity by typically
increasing in contractions and decreasing in expansions. Their timing is mea-
sured on an inverted basis by matching their specific-cycle peaks (troughs)
with business cycle troughs (peaks).
Some series, such as those on the monetary growth rates, have very long
leads when treated on the positive basis and shorter lags when treated on the
inverted basis. The influence from money to business would argue for the
former interpretation (downturns in monetary growth cause recessions; up-
turns cause recoveries); the influence from business to money may favor the
latter interpretation (e.g., recessions cause increases, and recoveries cause de-
creases, in the currency and reserve ratios). Theory does not make the choice
very easy, since it is agreed that the influences run both ways. The finding that
the dispersion of the timing comparisons is less when computed on the posi-
tive plan supports the matching oflike turns used in the early monetarist stud-
ies (see Friedman 1964, pp. 14-15).
Alternative interpretations also apply to another set of important cyclical
relations. When treated on an inverted basis, the principal lagging indicators
become long leaders. Interest rates usually rise early in business contractions
but decline later as pressures ofthe demand for credit ease and banks acquire
more reserves. But these declines signal reductions in the cost ofcredit, which
stimulate borrowing for more real investment and future production; in this
sense, they can be linked, with leads, to the next business revival, which they
are helping to bring about. The interest rates tend to decline through the early
recovery stages of expansion, and the later they tum up as a result of tighter
credit supply, the longer the expansion is likely to last (Cagan 1969). Long
records support the inference that bond yields lag and bond prices (approxi-
mately' inverted yields) lead at both peaks and troughs in aggregate economic
activity.
Other lagging series, like interest rates, also measure or reflect the costs of
doing business: unit labor cost, inventories carried in manufacturing and
trade, and business loans outstanding. The costs ofinputs oflabor, materials,
and capital will rise eventually during expansions as more and more industries
get to operate close to full-capacity utilization and higher. A large increase in
such costs relative to the levels of actual and expected prices would have
strong deterrent effects on new orders and contracts, credit extensions, etc.
This mechanism can produce a deteriorating "profit squeeze," depress busi-
ness confidence and new investment, and be instrumental in bringing on a
slowdown or even a recession. Conversely, declines in the overall level of295 Cyclical Indicators
financial, production, and inventory costs during contractions improve the ac-
tual and expected profit margins and pave the way for an upturn in the leading
and, later, the coincident indicators ofgeneral economic activity.
In fact, turning points in the lagging series occur before the opposite turn-
ing points in the leading series on average and with great regularity. The me-
dian troughs of a group of 30 lagging series led the median peaks of a group
of75 leading series in anticipation ofeach ofthe fifteen business cycle down-
turns between 1887 and 1937. The median peaks ofthe laggers led the median
troughs of the leaders thirteen times (and coincided twice) ahead of each of
the fifteen business cycle upturns between 1888 and 1938. The average leads
were 12 months at peaks of the leaders and 7 months at troughs. Analogous
comparisons based on twelve leading and six lagging indicators for 1949-82
produce seven leads in as many observations at peaks and seven leads out of
eight observations at troughs (one coincidence). Here the means are - 16 and
- 4 months respectively. The dispersions of the individual timing compari-
sons around these averages are large mainly because ofa few outliers. 4
Table 10.1 presents for the same groups of indicators a summary oftiming
at business cycle turns (rather than relative to each other). The entries in col-
umns 1, 3, and 5 make clear that the inverted laggers provide the earliest
signals of both peaks and troughs, followed by the leaders, and eventually
confirmed by the laggers (the coincident series are not included). The leads
tend to be longer at peaks than at troughs, particularly so for the first group
and in the postwar period, when expansions increased and contractions de-
creased greatly in duration. The lags tend to be longer at troughs than at peaks
in the same period.
10.5 Differences and Shifts in TIming at Peaks and Troughs
According to a count based on 103 series with long records, leads and lags
were equally frequent at peaks of the pre-1919 business cycles, whereas at
troughs leads were twice as frequent as lags. In 1919-38, the ratio ofleads to
lags was approximately 5 to 4 at both peaks and troughs. In a very comprehen-
sive sample of 188 series for 1948-70, leads outnumbered lags by more than
7 to 2, but the two categories were almost in balance at troughs (see table
10.2, lines 1-3).
Differences between the pre-1939 sample and the post-1947 sample cannot
explain the observed shifts in timing. Thus a set of40 long series that extend
through 1970 gives very similar results (lines 4-5). Moreover, a subset of 28
series that cover five business cycles in 1920-38 and five in 1948-70 provides
4. Omitting one very long lead associated with the business downturn of 1937 reduces the mean
for the early observations at peaks from - 12 to - 10 and the standard deviation from 11 to 4.
Omitting another unusually long lead associated with the revival of 1933 reduces the mean lead
for the early observations at troughs from -7 to - 5 and the standard deviation from 9 to 4. The
postwar comparisons include smaller outliers associated with the peaks of 1953 and 1980.296 Chapter Ten
Table 10.1 Leads and Lags ofGroups ofCyclical Indicators, Means and Standard
Deviations, 1885-1982 and Subperiods
1885-1919a 1948-82b I885-I982c
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Type ofTurn and Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leads(-) or Lags (+) at Peaks
Median trough, laggingd -17 11 -26 12 -20 12
Median peak, leading -5 4 -10 6 -7 5
Median peak, lagging +6 4 +5 3 +5 4
Leads ( - ) or Lags (+ ) at Troughs
Median peak, lagginge -13 9 -7 3 -11 8
Median trough, leading -6 3 -3 2 -5 3
Median trough, lagging +7 5 +10 5 +7 5
Sources: 1885-1938: Moore 1950, table 11, based on 75 leading and 30 lagging series. 1948-82: BCD,
October 1977, app. F and subsequent issues, based on 12 leading and 6 lagging series. For a list of all
observations used (leads and lags at the individual business cycle turns), see Zarnowitz and Moore 1986,
tables 9.15 and 9.16.
Note: S.D. = standard deviation.
aCovers 14 business cycle peaks in 1887-1913 and 1920-37 (August 1918 omitted) and 14 business
cycle troughs in 1885-1914 and 1919-38 (April 1919 omitted).
bCovers 8 business cycle peak in 1948-81 and 8 business cycle troughs in 1949-82.
cCovers 22 business cycle peaks and 22 business cycle troughs.
dData for the November 1948 peak not available.
eData for the May 1885 trough not available.
confirming evidence (lines 6-7). The latter sample also shows that leads at
peaks grew much longer in the postwar as compared with the interwar cycles,
and lags at peaks grew shorter. The differences are much smaller for the com-
parisons at troughs, where both the leads and the lags became moderately
smaller (see the last two lines in table 10.2).
The NBER reference cycle chronology has been subjected to several re-
views, most recently in Moore and Zamowitz 1986 (see also chapter 7). It is
unlikely to contain errors sufficiently large and systematic to be responsible
for the above-noted asymmetries and shifts in the distributions ofthe cyclical
timing comparisons. 5
What then can explain these observations? It is possible for strong upward
trends to skew the timing ofmany indicators toward lags at peaks and leads at
troughs. The differences between the measures for the pre-1919 and 1919-38
cycles are consistent with this simple hypothesis, because the interwar period
as a whole was marked by reduced upward trends (less real growth and more
deflation). But the distributions shifted even further toward leads at peaks and
lags at troughs in 1948-70, despite the higher growth and inflation trends then
5. For early discussions of this point, see Moore 1961, ch. 7, esp. pp. 222-25; and Mitchell
1951, pp. 73-75.297 Cyclical Indicators
Table 10.2 Distributions of Leads and Lags at Business Cycle Peaks and Troughs in
Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods
Business Cycle Peaks Business Cycle Troughs
Time Timing
Series Observations Leads Coincidences Lags Leads Coincidences Lags
(no.) (no.) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Nonmatching Samples
Before 1919 103 1,263 46 9 46 62 8 30
1919-38 103 919 50 12 38 46 19 36
1948-70 188 1,442 75 7 20 36 21 43
B. Matching Samples
Before 1939 40 562 48 11 40 55 12 32
1948-70 40 343 72 8 20 43 19 38
1920--38 28 259 55 11 34 45 17 38
1948-70 28 236 73 8 19 43 16 41
Addendum: Mean Lead ( - ) or Lag (+ ), in Months
All Observations
Leads at Lags at Leads at Lags at
Peaks Troughs Peaks Peaks Troughs Troughs
1920--38 -2.0 + 1.1 -6.8 +5.0 -6.0 +9.7
1948-70 -7.5 + 1.0 -11.0 +3.1 -4.4 +7.2
Note: In some lines, the entries for leads, coincidences, and lags in cols. 3-5 or 6-8 fail to add up
exactly to 100 due to rounding. Each of the 103 series used in lines 1 and 2 has a record beginning
before 1919 and extending through 1938 and has been accepted for cyclical conformity and timing in
either the full period covered or 1919-38. This sample was examined in Moore 1950 (reprinted in Moore
1961, pp. 222-25). The sample of 188 series (line 3) includes all indicators evaluated in the 1972-75
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) review. The sample of 40 series (lines 4 and 5) is a subset of the
longest series from the same BEA collection (10 start in 1857-89,24 in 1907-21, and 6 in 1926-29).
The sample of 28 series (lines 7-9) is a subset of the previous one that covers 5 peaks and 5 troughs of
business cycles in 1920-38 and an equal number ofturns ofeither type in 1948-70.
prevailing (cf. lines 1-3 in the table). This is contrary to the hypothesized
trend effects.
The most likely explanation of the contrast between the interwar and the
postwar distributions of the measures of timing at peaks and troughs derives
from the reasons for the moderation ofbusiness cycles (chapter 3). Structural,
institutional, and policy changes tended to support the forces of expansion
and counteract those of contraction. The economy grew more responsive to
the former and more resistant to the latter. Hence recessions, once recognized
as such, were not permitted to endure and deepen but ended in relatively con-
centrated and symmetrical upturns. Expansions survived weaknesses in the
cyclically sensitive sectors more easily than before; and when such slow-
downs did worsen and spread so as to bring about a decline in aggregate activ-
ity, the process was now often much more protracted than it used to be. The
slowdowns that preceded the business cycle peaks were accompanied by298 Chapter Ten
many leads in sensItIve indicators and generally much dispersion of the
specific-cycle peaks.6
Expansions were much longer and contractions much shorter in 1948-70
than in 1920-38, and this probably helps explain the differences in the average
size ofleads and lags between the two periods, as shown in the last section of
table 10.2. The hypothesis is that the lags at initial troughs and the leads at
terminal peaks tend to increase with the length of expansions, whereas the
lags at initial peaks and the leads at terminal troughs increase with the length
of contractions. This implies that cyclical timing relations are more stable in
terms of business cycle time than in terms of calendar time (see chapter 6,
sec. 6.3).
The evidence from the data used in table 10.1 and from the phase durations
in peacetime business cycles of 1887-1982 is on the whole consistent with the
above hypothesis. The correlations between the durations of business expan-
sions on the one hand and the leads and lags internal to the corresponding
expansions on the other are all positive, and halfofthem are quite high (table
10.3, lines 1-4). The analogous correlations with business contractions are
also positive (except one that is effectively zero), but most are smaller (lines
5-8). This presumably reflects the fact that many contractions were similar in
being short, particularly in the postwar period, and the same applies to the
recent average leads at troughs. With more observations of greater variety, it
seems plausible that the hypothesis would receive stronger support.7
There is also related evidence that the lengths ofthe leads or lags at succes-
sive turning points are positively correlated (Zarnowitz and Moore 1986, pp.
565, 568-71). These correlations refer directly to the intervals between the
turns in the indicator series and make no use ofthe business cycle chronology.
They too apply as well to comparisons between opposite turns as to those
between like turns. All ofthis is certainly consistent with the idea that cyclical
influences run from lagging to leading indicators as well as in the opposite
direction. As detailed in the next two sections, these dynamic interactions
form an integral part of business cycles, helping to shape and being them-
selves shaped by the movement of aggregate economic activity (coincident
indicators).
6. It is well to observe that this prevalence of flat downturns and sharp upturns is the direct
opposite ofthe asymmetry noted for the pre-1939 sample of indicators, which was attributed by
Mitchell (1951, p. 75) "mainly to a difference between peaks and troughs in the average character
of the arrays of specific-cycle timing dates. . . . At the peaks these arrays are on the average
relatively compact and symmetrical; at the troughs the arrays are more dispersed and skewed
toward leads."
7. Consider a diversified collection of indicators, all extending over the same stretch of time,
which includes an equal numberofbusiness expansions and contractions. The numberofspecific-
cycle turns that match business cycle turns (peaks and troughs combined) is about equally divided
between business expansions and contractions. Ifcontractions are short and expansions long, for
example, the density of the turns in the series and their proximity to the business cycle turns
should on the average be greater in contractions than in expansions.299 Cyclical Indicators
Table 10.3 Correlations between Leads and Lags ofGroups ofIndicators and

















A. With Durations ofBusiness Expansionsb
Leads at peaks ofMdT-Lg + .87 + .97
Leads ofMdT-Lg relative to MdP-L + .78 + .95
Leads at peaks of MdP-L + .50 + .51
Lags at initial troughs of MdT-Lg + .12 + .82
B. With Durations ofBusiness Contractionsc
Leads at troughs of MdP-Lg + .90 +.43
Leads ofMdP-Lg relative to MdT-L + .82 + .60
Leads at troughs ofMdT-L + .21 - .01









Sources: See table 10.1
aAbbreviations: Md, median; T, trough; P, peak; Lg, lagging group; L, leading group. For ex-
ample, line 1 refers to "median trough, lagging group."
bNumber ofobservations per entry in cols. 1,2, and 3 is 14, 5, and 19, respectively.
cNumber ofobservations per entry in cols. 1, 2, and 3 is 14, 6, and 20, respectively.
10.6 Economic Process and Cyclical Timing
Business cycle indicators have been selected, analyzed, and reviewed in a
long series of comprehensive and detailed studies (Mitchell and Bums 1938;
Moore 1950, 1961; Shiskin 1961a; Moore and Shiskin 1967; Zamowitz and
Boschan 1975a, 1975b). The results include a cross-classification ofall indi-
vidual indicators by types of economic process and characteristic timing in
recessions and recoveries.
Table 10.4 summarizes this material for the 112 series included in the sec-
tion on "Cyclical Indicators" in Business Conditions Digest (BCD), a monthly
report ofthe Bureau ofEconomic Analysis (BEA) in the U.S. Department of
Commerce. 8 The indicators are divided into seven groups representing major
economic processes and into more than thirty smaller subgroups. For each of
the latter, part A (B) of the table lists the median leads or lags at business
cycle peaks (troughs) of 1948-80.
The proportions of leaders, coinciders, and laggers are 57%, 22%, and
21% at peaks and 44%, 20%, and 36% at troughs, respectively. More series
anticipated recessions than recoveries in this representative collection ofpost-
8. BCD (called Business Cycle Developments before 1968) began publication in 1961 and was
discontinued in March 1990. From April 1990 on, data and charts on business cycle indicators are





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































war indicators. Moreover, the average leads were in general markedly longer
at downturns than at upturns. The opposite applies to the lags, which tended
to be both fewer and shorter at peaks.
The general conspectus of timing relationships that are typical of business
cycles was introduced in chapter 2 (see table 2.4 and text); table 10.4 extends
and quantifies that schematic representation. Read horizontally, the table
shows the within-process sequences: for example, marginal employment ad-
justments (average workweek, overtime hours, claims for unemployment in-
surance) led at business cycle peaks by long intervals, job vacancies by inter-
mediate intervals, and unemployment by short intervals; comprehensive
employment had roughly coincident timing; and long-term unemployment
and average duration ofunemployment lagged. At troughs, the sequence was
somewhat different in that job vacancies and most unemployment series
lagged. Read vertically, the table shows which variables in different
economic-process groups had similar timing. To illustrate, marginal employ-
ment adjustments, new orders for consumer goods, business investment com-
mitments (new appropriations, orders and contracts for capital goods), change
in inventories, stock prices, corporate profits, and money change and credit
flows, allIed at both peaks and troughs.
Series on job vacancies and unemployment (inverted) illustrate the mixed
category of leads at peaks and lags at troughs. This is because employment
typically rises slowly in both the initial and the late stages ofa business expan-
sion, whereas the labor force grows at a fairly steady pace.9 Capacity utiliza-
tion rates exemplify series that lead at peaks and coincide at troughs, presum-
ably again reflecting the recent patterns offlat downturns and sharp upturns.
Most indicators, however, tend to either lead at both types of tum or be
roughly coincident or lag at both. The identities of the leaders, coinciders,
and laggers remain unchanged over long stretches oftime, as documented by
repeated reviews oftheir performance. That is, the medians in table 10.4 are
generally quite representative in the sense that leads prevail heavily for the
series listed on the left, rough coincidences (including leads and lags of 3
months or less) for the series listed in the middle, and lags for the series listed
on the right. But it should be noted that this qualitative continuity coexists
with a good deal of variation in the magnitudes of the individual leads (lags)
recorded over time for a particular leading (lagging) indicator.
Table 10.5 lists the medians and ranges of the leads and lags for the same
groups ofindicators at the 1981 peak and the 1982 trough ofthe severe reces-
sion that issued in the long expansion ofthe past decade. Comparisons ofthe
corresponding entries in this table and table 10.4 confirm that the timing clas-
sifications established some time ago in the BCD generally held up well. As
9. The reasons why employment recovers relatively slowly lie in the initial uncertainties about
the prospects for an enduring expansion and the concurrent rises in the average workweek and
labor productivity. The reasons why employment grows less in late than in midexpansion stages
lie in demand slowdowns or supply constraints or both.304 Chapter Ten
Table 10.5 Timing ofGroups ofIndicators in the Recession and Recovery of 1981-83
Median Lead (-) or Lag (+) (mo.)
Business Cycle Business Cycle
Peale Trough:
Line Group (no. of series) July 1981 November 1982
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I. Employment and Unemployment (15 series)
1 Marginal employment adjustments (3) -6(-3 to -7) -2 (+ 1 to -2)
2 Job vacancies (2) -8 (same) -2 (same)
3 Comprehensive employment (5) 0(0 to -7) +2(Oto +4)
4 Comprehensive unemployment (3) 0(0 to + 1) + 1 (0 to + 1)
5 Average duration & long-term +3 (+ 1, +5) +5 (+ 1, +9)
unemployment (2)
II. Production andIncome (10)
6 Capacity utilization (2) - 3.5(-2, - 5) o(same)
7 Comprehensive output & income (4) + 1(-1 to +2) - 0.5 (0 to - 3)
8 Industrial production (4) + 0.5 (0 to + 1) 0(0 to -6)
III. Consumption, Trade, Orders, and Deliveries (13)
9 Change in unfilled orders; vendor - 3.5 (+ 1 to - 7) -7.5 (-3 to -10)
performance; retail sales (4)
10 New orders (3) -2 (same) -1 (same)
11 Unfilled orders; production ofconsumer o(same) o(same)
goods (2)
12 Manufacturing & trade sales (2) 0(-1, +1) -1 (same)
13 Index ofconsumer sentiment; car + 1(same) -10(-8, -12)
buying (2)
IV. Fixed Capital Investment (18)
14 Formation ofbusiness enterprises (2) -2(-1, -3) -3(-2, -4)
15 Business investment commitments (5) - 3(-3 to -8) -3 (+ 1 to -3)
16 Capital appropriations (2) 0(-2, +2) + 0.5(-3, +4)
17 Business investment expenditures (6) -2.5(Oto -4) +3 (0 to +6)
18 Residential construction (3) - 10 (- 8 to - 10) - 12 (- 9 to - 13)
V. Inventories andInventory Investment (9)
19 Inventory investment (4) - 0.5 (+ 1 to - 2) 0(0 to - 5)
20 Inventories on hand & on order (5) +4 (0 to +6) +7 (+ 1 to +8)
VI. Prices, Costs, and Profits (19)
21 Sensitive commodity prices & stock - 9.5 (- 8 to - 12) - 9 (+ 1to - 14)
prices (4)
22 Corporate profits & margins after taxes -5(-2 to -8) +3 (0 to +3)
(4)
23 Same with inventory valuation and +4 (+ 1 to +4) -9 (0 to -9)
capital consumption adjustments;
price/unit labor costs ratio (4)
24 Corporate cash flows (2) -0.5 (+4, - 5) -9 (same)
25 Unit labor costs & labor share (5) + 16 (+ 10 to + 19) + 12 (+ 9 to + 20)
VII. Money and Credit (28)
26 Changes in money supply & liquid - 11 (-6 to - 13) -9 (0 to -14)
assets (3)305 Cyclical Indicators
Table 10.5 Continued










Group (no. of series)
(2)
Real money supply (2)
Velocity of money (2)











-2 (+6 to -9)
n.t.
n.t.








-1 (+ 1to -9)
n.t.
n.t.
+5 (+2 to +8)
+8.5(+8, +11)
Note: The entries in cols. 3 and 4 are medians ofleads and lags for the groups ofindicators listed in col.
2 and (in parentheses) the ranges of the corresponding observations for the individual series in each
group. Where the group consists oftwo series only, both observations are listed. Where all observations
for the group are identical, the designation is "(same)." Where no timing comparisons can be made for
any series in the group, the entry reads "n.t." (no specific turning points matching the 1981 business
cycle peak or the 1982 business cycle trough). For the identification ofthe source and the series covered,
see table 10.4.
would be expected, however, there were individual abberations. The down-
turn in July 1981 occurred abruptly, cutting short a recovery that began only a
year earlier. Because there was no slowdown, some series that typically lead
at peaks were tardy this time: the index of consumer sentiment, consumer
expenditures on automobiles, and change in business inventories. At the No-
vember 1982 trough, job vacancies had a short lead instead of the usual lag,
and business investment and profits turned upward late instead ofclose to the
reference date.
10.7 How the Indicators Performed before and after World War II
The first list of indicators of both revivals and recoveries, based on data
available through 1938, appeared in Moore 1950. Later Moore (1979) com-
pared the historical timing record ofthese series in periods ofvarying lengths
between 1860 and 1938 (mostly interwar years) with the record of the same
series or their current equivalents in 1948-75. This is a rather demanding test
of the postsample performance for the indicators, considering the many pro-
found differences between the U.S. economy before 1938 and after 1948.
Table 10.6 is a summary ofthe main findings from Moore 1979. Ofthe 21
indicators originally selected in 1950, 15 continued to be carried in the BCD
through 1979. The other six were replaced by related series available from the
same source. For three leading indicators and one lagging, the substitutes are
very close; for the two coincident indicators, much less so (see the notes to306 Chapter Ten
Table 10.6 Prior and Subsequent Performance ofThree Groups ofIndicators
Selected and Classified in 1950





Laggingc Leadinga Coincidentb Laggingc
Through 1938
1948-75
Average Lead(-) or Lag (+), in Months
-6 0 +5 -5







Percentage ofTiming Comparisons in Appropriate Class
80 72 88 81 67
89 60 68. 71 84
72
73
Source: Moore 1979, pp. 408-9 (reprinted in Moore 1983, ch. 24, pp. 376-77).
aThe leading group includes eight series: liabilities of business failures; Dow-Jones index of
industrial common stock prices (S&P 500 index in 1948-75); new orders, durable goods, value;
residential building contracts, floorspace (new building permits, private housing units, number
in 1948-75); commercial and industrial building contracts, floorspace; average workweek, man-
ufacturing; new incorporations, number; wholesale price index, 28 basic commodities (industrial
materials price index, 13 commodities in 1948-75).
bThe roughly coincident group includes eight series: employment in nonagricultural establish-
ments; persons unemployed, number; corporate profits after taxes; bank debits outside New York
(manufacturing and trade sales, value, in 1948-75); freight car loadings (value of goods output,
1972 dollars, in 1948-75); industrial production index; gross national product, value; wholesale
price index, industrial commodities.
cThe lagging group includes five series: personal income, value; retail sales, value; consumer
installment debt, value; bank rates on business loans; manufacturers' inventories, book value
(manufacturing and trade inventories, book value, in 1948-75).
the table for details). To simplify and save space, only the overall group aver-
ages are shown here, but the underlying observations at individual turns are
on the whole consistent with the conclusion that the postwar data tend to sup-
port the choices and classifications made 30 years earlier on the strength of
the pre-1938 information.
In particular, it is clear that the leaders as a group continued to lead, though
by longer intervals at peaks and shorter ones at troughs. The laggers continued
to lag. Among the 1948-75 timing comparisons for the series designated as
leading indicators in 1950, the relative frequency of leads increased moder-
ately at peaks and decreased at troughs. The lagging indicators performed
worse at peaks but equally well at troughs in the postwar as compared with
the pre-1938 sample period.
10.8 How to Explain the Cyclical Sequences
There are good reasons to expect the observed cyclical timing sequences to
persist, as they indeed do. To a large extent, established procedures and tech-307 Cyclical Indicators
nologies determine which series move early and which late relative to each
other. For example, before funds for new capital projects are disbursed, they
must be appropriated; before plants are built, construction contracts are
placed; before equipment is paid for and installed, it must be ordered; before
expenditures on residential investment are recorded, building permits are
taken out and housing starts are counted.
Moreover, new investment commitments come close to representing invest-
ment planning on the demand side, and payments for capital goods and their
production, delivery, or installation represent more nearly investment realiza-
tions on the supply side. Where substantial gestation lags intervene, the dis-
tinction is important. Thus, according to the theory of desired stock-flow
adjustments, planned investment should lead total output, including con-
sumption as well as (realized) investment. The flexible accelerator theory also
applies to inventories, where it suggests that inventory investment tends to
lead sales and that the ratio ofmanufacturing and trade inventories to the cor-
responding sales lags.
Additional explanations derive from monetary and financial arrangements.
The rate ofchange in business and consumer credit outstanding leads because
new loans serve to finance investment in processes that are themselves leading
(in inventories, housing, and consumer durables; also in plant and equipment,
where the loans are taken out early in the process). Here too, there are timing
sequences that reflect stock-flow relationships: net increments lead; totals lag.
Credit flows have large early movements, but debt aggregates are smooth and
sluggish. Money growth rates are very volatile but tend to lead by variable,
though mostly long, intervals. Monetary aggregates themselves are domi-
nated by upward trends and show persistent declines only in cycles with se-
vere contractions. However, real money balances, such as the broadly defined
money supply M2 deflated by a consumer price index, declined well ahead of
several recent peaks in total output and employment and rose well ahead of
troughs. That is, in late stages of expansion (contraction) money increased
less (more) than prices. Here both endogenous and exogenous elements are
important; notably, changes in the nominal money stock depend on the policy-
controlled changes in the monetary base.
Interest rates (much influenced by the actual and expected changes in
money, credit, and prices) tend to lag. This does not mean that they are to be
viewed as only a result, not a cause, of the economy's cyclical course and
future: they are both. Changes in the level and structure of interest rates are
important codeterminants, along with risk premiums, ofdiscount factors and
stock returns, cost of finance, and investment opportunities. Expectations of
changes in the price level vary across the economy and over time, and interest
rates adjust to these changes, in ways that are not directly or reliably observ-
able, let alone predictable. Nominal rates play an important role in the inter-
actions ofmoney demand and supply. Therefore, nominal rates matter at least
as much as real rates in business cycle developments.308 Chapter Ten
Cost-price-productivity-profit linkages give rise to other cyclical sequen-
ces. Changes in prices ofsensitive materials precede changes in producer and
consumer prices. Changes in labor productivity (output per hour) lead;
changes in unit labor cost lag. As a result ofthese tendencies connected with
cyclical movements in sales and the rates of utilization of labor and capital,
profit margins and totals show early and large fluctuations. (For further dis-
cussion ofthe subjects ofthis and the preceding paragraph, see chapters 2, 3,
and 4.)
Stock prices track and anticipate the broad movements of corporate earn-
ings (leading) and interest rates (lagging) and relate positively to the former,
inversely to the latter. This helps explain the cyclicality and early timing of
broadly based indexes ofcommon stock prices. Long records ofsuch indexes,
in the United States and abroad, document that bear markets tend to begin
well before business contractions and bull markets well before expansions.
But the indexes also show additional, sizable movements because stock prices
are apparently quite sensitive to noncyclical short-term influences or shocks
as well.
Some timing relations reflect directly the changing state of the economy.
Thus delivery periods get progressively longer just before and during recov-
eries and especially in booms, when orders back up and strain the capacity to
produce; and they get progressively shorter when an expansion slows down
and a contraction develops. This explains the leads of vendor performance
(percentage ofcompanies receiving slower deliveries). The early timing ofthe
change in unfilled orders can be explained similarly. The ratio of unfilled or-
ders to sales measures roughly the number of months it would take for the
backlog ofwork to be eliminated at the current levels ofactivity. When expan-
sions slow gradually, as they did on several recent occasions, these indicators
peak early along with the capacity utilization rates. This helps account for the
long leads at the corresponding business downturns of other series, too, no-
tably indexes ofconsumer expectations, new orders for consumer goods and
materials, and contracts and orders for plant and equipment.
Last but not least, there is a simple rationale for the sequences among the
labor market series. Changes in hours are less binding than changes in the
number employed, so the average workweek in manufacturing leads because
it is altered early in response to uncertain signs of shifts in the demand for
output. Initial claims for unemployment insurance change slightly ahead
of the overall unemployment rate, whereas long-term unemployment and
the jobless rate among persons unemployed 15 weeks and over lag behind.
People with the least qualifications and weakest attachments to the labor
force lose jobs early and gain jobs late whenever the economy slows and de-
clines.309 Cyclical Indicators
10.9 Significance in Macro and Micro Theories
The existence of regular timing sequences among economic time series is
necessary but not sufficient to demonstrate that some indicators are likely to
lead, others to have approximately coincident timing, and still others to lag at
business cycle turns. What is needed in addition is (1) that the movements
involved have cyclical dimensions with respect to duration and amplitudes
and (2) that the coincident indicators, which include the aggregates of input
and output as implied by the definition of business cycles, occupy central
positions in many ofthe sequences. Both requirements are amply satisfied, as
already demonstrated by our measures.
The indicators in current use play important roles in many areas viewed as
critical in business cycle theories. This is illustrated in table 10.7, which is
based on a long series of studies (for references, see chapters 2 and 5 and
Moore 1983, pp. 347-51).
The literature on business cycles, though rich in ingenious hypotheses of
varying plausibility and compatibility, produced no unified theory (chapter 2).
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There is evidence in support of a number of different models that focus on
period-specific or sector-specific aspects ofthe economy's motion. Monocau-
sal theories may help explain some episodes but are invalidated by long ex-
perience.
Some more or less formal models have been developed recently to explain
why some of the leading indicators lead. Popkin (1984, 1990) stresses the
importance of intermediate transactions between producing units rather than
with final purchasers, and ofthe production ofgoods rather than services. He
argues that the latter are only weakly cyclical; it is the goods-producing indus-
tries, mainly manufacturing, that are most sensitive to business cycles. There-
fore, manufacturing is and should be strongly represented on the list of prin-
cipal leading indicators used in composite indexes. The series concerned
include new orders for consumer goods and materials, contracts and orders
for plant and equipment, the average workweek of production workers in
manufacturing, vendor performance, change in manufacturing inventories on
hand and on order, and the percentage change in sensitive materials prices.
All of these, except the last one, are in real terms. Popkin builds, estimates,
and simulates a quarterly log-linear model linking final demand (sales) with
intermediate manufactures. Retailers place orders for finished goods, whose
producers react by changing unfilled orders and/or inventories and/or output.
These adjustments determine the profit margins over costs oflabor and mate-
rials and, hence, output prices, given the wages and material prices paid. The
results show that the amplitudes ofcyclical fluctuations transmitted from final
sales are systematically greater for the manufacturers ofmaterials than for the
manufacturers of finished products, and greater for the latter than for the re-
tailers. The magnification appears in ratios of cyclical to control solutions of
the model for outputs, inventories, new orders, and prices. The analysis re-
calls earlier studies of vertical (interstage) transmission of demand move-
ments through changes in new and unfilled orders and inventories (Zamowitz
1962, 1973; Mack 1967; Childs 1967).
A model of the short-run behavior of a firm that attempts to minimize the
costs of meeting expected demand is shown by de Leeuw (1991) to be
consistent with the relative timing and amplitudes ofnew orders, output, ship-
ments, employment, average hours, and changes in unfilled orders and inven-
tories-under many but not all conditions. The outcomes of model simula-
tions depend on whether production is to order or to stock; on whether the
initiating disturbances occur in actual or expected demand or productivity;
and on whether the expectations are formed adaptively or on the assumption
ofperfect foresight. Tests based on regressions ofalternative measures ofout-
put growth on lagged values of employment growth, changes in inventories
and unfilled orders, and alternative proxies for expected demand are found to
be on the whole encouraging.
According to de Leeuw (1989), it is possible that business cycles reflect to311 Cyclical Indicators
a large extent movements in certain fundamental forces ("prime movers")
such as "monetary and fiscal policies, regulatory decisions, foreign economic
developments, demographic shifts, new technologies, droughts or bumper
crops, and a few others" (p. 23). Yet few prime movers are included in
the lists of principal leading indicators for the United States and other coun-
tries. 1O After considering several possible reasons and remedies for this, de
Leeuw develops a "prime-mover-based" leading index by means of a regres-
sion ofoutput on M2, cyclically adjusted federal expenditures, exports, rela-
tive import prices, inflation, and the GNP gap (where the first two of the
variables listed are taken as first differences in logs, and the next three as
second differences to proxy for unexpected changes). An index obtained by
transformation of the values produced by the above regression declined only
slightly and irregularly in 1955-57 and 1968-69, leading by long intervals
but not distinctly at the 1957 and 1970 peaks in the coincident index; its move-
ment was essentially trendless and random in the 1950s and dominated by a
rising trend in the 1960s. In 1970-88 this index of prime movers acquired
more cyclicality and definitely declined in 1973-74 and 1978-81, with long
leads at the peaks of 1973 and 1980. It skipped the recessions of 1953-54 and
1960 and failed to signal the 1981 peak (see de Leeuw 1989, chart 2).
The performance ofthis construct as a leading indicator is relatively weak,
in my view. Moreover, de Leeuw's results are not surprising. As noted in
chapter 3, the effects offiscal policy on aggregate economic activity have not
been particularly consistent. Also, our vector autoregressive model estimates
in chapter 12 confirm that fiscal variables contribute little to the determination
of changes in real GNP in the presence of several much more powerful vari-
ables, notably an index of selected leading indicators. Monetary policy had
stronger effects but also lacked consistency and contained important endoge-
nous components. In the 1980s the volatility ofgrowth rates increased for all
monetary aggregates, and their performance as cyclical indicators deterio-
rated (see Cagan 1990). Deflation helps and M2 is still a relatively good
choice among the monetary series (as is the monetary base, according to Ca-
gan). But other areas produce better leading indicators (e.g., in real invest-
ment, credit, sensitive prices).
10. The U.S. composite index ofleading indicators contains one series classified by de Leeuw
as a prime mover, namely, the deflated money supply. The Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) has identified leading indicators in 21 countries, and out of 180
such series 36, or 20%, are designated prime movers in de Leeuw 1989, table 1. (These include
18 money supply series, 8 export series, 8 terms-of-trade series, and 2 leading indicators for
neighboring countries.) Ofthe leading indicators for 10 countries as selected at Columbia Univer-
sity's Center for International Business Cycle Research (CIBCR), only 3% are so designated. The
CIBCR indicators are by design generally similar to those chosen for the United States in the
NBER and BEA studies (P. A. Klein and Moore 1985); the OECD indicators deviate more from
the U.S. selections. It should be noted that both the OECD and the CIBCR international indicators
refer directly to growth cycles rather than business cycles.312 Chapter Ten
Enough has been said on the reasons for the observed behavior ofthe indi-
cators and their links to micro and business cycle theories to weaken if not
disprove the charge of "measurement without theory." If the reasons are
simple, so much the better.
10.10 Modeling with Cyclical Indicators
The development of modem macroeconomic models was closely related to
the idea of interdependence among the major components of aggregate in-
come and output. Correspondingly, the econometric implementation of these
models was closely related to the development and structure of national in-
come and product accounts (NIPA). The builders ofmacroeconometric mod-
els drew heavily on the NIPA data, first in annual and later in quarterly form.
Also, the models soon acquired a Keynesian orientation, which meant a shift
from the direct interest in business cycles (which dominated at the beginning:
Tinbergen 1938-39) to a preoccupation with the determinants oflevels ofag-
gregate output and employment in the short run.
In contrast, the development of the indicators was from the beginning mo-
tivated by the need for timely detection or prediction ofbusiness cycle turning
points (the first one was the revival from the slump of 1937-38; see Mitchell
and Bums 1938). The objective being the analysis ofcurrent business condi-
tions and the forecasting, recognition, measurement, and appraisal of reces-
sions and recoveries, the approach uses mainly monthly, and to a lesser extent
quarterly, times series. The indicators are generally endogenous variables (not
exogenous "prime movers"); that is, they influence the economy and are influ-
enced by it. The traditional NBER approach, with its emphasis on the dichot-
omies of contraction and expansion, peak and trough, seems to lend more
support to endogenous and nonlinear theories than to exogenous and linear
theories of the business cycle. On the other hand, most macromodels are not
fundamentally nonlinear and rely heavily on outside forces and shocks to ac-
count for the very existence ofbusiness cycles (chapters 6 and 9).
The evolution of macroeconomics led to progressively less dependence of
both the theoretical and the econometric models on the early Keynesian ideas
and progressively more dependence on principles ofoptimization and market
clearing. The theory underlying the system ofcyclical indicators is largely of
a different type, nalnely, the dynamics ofplans and expectations under uncer-
tainty and of institutional and physical constraints in processes of production
and investment.
All these differences ofobjective, concept, data, and method make it diffi-
cult to combine cyclical indicators and econometric models in some compre-
hensive and systematic way. Yet the two approaches are complementary in
important respects. The indicators are indispensable for the analysis of the
current course and near future ofthe economy. As such the required data need
to be systematically collected, monitored, and processed into appropriate313 Cyclical Indicators
composite indexes (the latter will be discussed in chapter 11). For years now
this task has been performed by the Commerce Department (BEA), which
amounts to a de facto endorsement ofthe indicator methodology by the federal
government. 11 The active macroeconometric models, which have meanwhile
grown greatly in size and complexity, are not well equipped to track the cur-
rent developments and forecast or at least recognize promptly the key business
cycle events. But they are designed to make quantitative quarterly and/or an-
nual forecasts from sets ofestimated economic relationships, and indeed this
is increasingly their main function. In actual practice, there are probably few
professional forecasters with macromodels, and few experienced users of
quantitative forecasts who would ignore the signals from indicators. 12
Some leading indicators are regularly included in large econometric mod-
els. For example, vendor performance acts as an important determinant of
industrial prices and inventory investment in the Data Resources, Inc. (DRI),
model (Eckstein 1983). Housing starts are related to the variables governing
the demand for housing services, the stock ofhousing, and cost and availabil-
ity ofmortgage financing; then residential construction is estimated as a mov-
ing average of starts. Contracts and orders for plant and equipment could be
treated similarly but are not (more attention is paid to survey data on invest-
ment intentions). The labor input in the production function is represented by
the product of employment and the average hours worked. The distinction
between the fast short-run adjustment of weekly hours and the slower adjust-
ment ofthe number of workers is made in one version ofthe Wharton model
(L. R. Klein 1990). The demand functions for money and other financial as-
sets generally follow the modern portfolio theory, but with many elaborations
in the large-scale models, and the monetary base or unborrowed reserves are
treated as an exogenous variable subject to control by the Federal Reserve.
Price indexes for raw and intermediate industrial materials play an important
role but as early indicators ofinflation rather than changes in real activity.
It is clearthat these uses ofthe leaders, though important, are quite different
from those made of the same variables in the indicator approach. They are
more indirect, partial, and limited. The interdependence oftiming, stressed in
the indicator system, receives no special consideration in the models. There is
aggregation by time, because it is still difficult to construct monthly models,
and the lag specifications are often crude.
Yet some model builders report making intensive use of monthly indicator
data. As discussed by L. R. Klein (1990, pp. 104-5), the recent "Pennsylva-
nia approach" is as follows. Selected monthly series, including many cyclical
indicators, leading and others, are estimated and extrapolated by means of
formal time-series models (e.g., ARIMA, VAR). Averaged into quarterly val-
11. Many state governments and foreign countries have followed the United States in compiling
their own leading indicators and indexes.
12. Incidentally, the same applies to the makers and users of"judgmental" forecasts. For more
on these matters, see chapters 13, 14 and 18.314 Chapter Ten
ues, they are then used to project many GNP components for the current quar-
ter and one quarter ahead. Constant-term adjustments, or "add-factors," are
applied to the results obtained from the model equations to make them agree
reasonably well with the indicator-based estimates. Longer solutions are pro-
duced by simulation techniques with the add-factors retained in the model.
This method permits a combination ofhigh- and lower-frequency magnitudes
calculated, respectively, from the monthly indicators and the quarterly model.
Small forecasting models that incorporate selected leading indicators along
with third-order autoregressions and that use pooled international data have
been found to generate relatively accurate and efficient predictions of annual
and quarterly growth rates ofreal output for eight European countries and the
United States (Garcia-Ferrer et al. 1987). Such forecasts, while much more
limited in scope than those produced by elaborate international efforts using
large econometric models, are also much less costly yet quite competitive in
quality. The leading indicators used include real stock returns and growth rates
in money supply for each country and all countries combined. 13
10.11 Conclusion and BriefPreview ofPart III
This chapter has been concerned mainly with the systematic aspects ofcy-
clical indicators and their analytical characteristics and functions. But the
principal uses ofthe indicators are in forecasting. Here it becomes essential to
construct the composite indexes ofleading, coincident, and lagging indicators
from preselected series. Such indexes, and particularly those designed to lead,
can be built, applied, and assessed in various ways. They are the subject of
chapter 11.
It remains to offer some concluding and forward-looking remarks. When
used collectively, the indicators provide over the course of business cycles a
revolving flow of signals. Shallow and spotty declines in the leading series
provide only weak and uncertain warnings; a run of several large declines
increases the risk of a general and serious slowdown or recession. The latter
may suggest some stabilizing policy actions that, ifeffective, could falsify the
warning. The coincident indicators confirm or invalidate the expectations
based on the behavior of the leaders and any related policy decisions. The
lagging indicators provide further checks on the previously derived infer-
ences, in particular on any early designation ofthe timing ofa business cycle
term. Moreover, for reasons stated earlier (sec. 10.4), they also act as predic-
tors when used in inverted form.
Macroeconomic forecasting, which the indicator system is designed to aid,
must be essentially consistent with the ascertained regularities of business
fluctuations. Some of these "stylized facts" may be difficult to reconcile with
13. It is interesting to note that to my knowledge, the large models generally do not include
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the preconceptions ofthe general-equilibrium theory, but this does not dimin-
ish the value of the indicator analysis. The real problems with the indicators
are mainly practical. Large amounts ofrandom noise, large revisions oforig-
inally published figures, and short lead times (which occur mostly at troughs
ofshort recessions) detract from the usefulness ofsome leading series. Those
irregular variations and data errors in its components that are independent tend
to cancel out in the leading index, which is therefore relatively smooth. As a
result, the problem of extra turns or false warnings is reduced, but it is not
eliminated.
Chapter 11 will discuss why and how the composite indexes are constructed
and used and with what results, as assessed by repeated tests. Chapter 12
examines the role of a combination of leading indicators in the framework of
a simple VAR model that also includes total output, monetary and fiscal vari-
ables, and interest and inflation rates.